EXHIBIT B

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
 1
                       FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
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                           SOUTHERN DIVISION
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       JOHN DOE,
                                  )
            Plaintiff,
                                  )
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                                  )
                                     CIVIL CASE NO. 22-0872-PX
            vs.
                                  )
 5
       THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND)
 6
       COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND,
       et al,
 7
            Defendants.
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                       Tuesday, March 28, 2023
                            Courtroom 2C
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                        Greenbelt, Maryland
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                          MOTIONS HEARING
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                THE HONORABLE PAULA XINIS, Judge
       BEFORE:
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       For the Plaintiff:
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         **Computer-Aided Transcription of Stenotype Notes**
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                               Reported by:
23
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                               410-962-4753
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2	(Appearances Continued)
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(Proceeding commenced at 1:01 p.m.)

THE DEPUTY CLERK: The matter now pending before this Court is Civil Number PX-22-0872, Doe v. The University of Maryland College Park, Maryland, et al. We're here today for the purpose of a motions hearing. Counsel, please introduce yourselves for the record, beginning with the plaintiff.

MR. NORTH: Good morning, Your Honor. Benjamin

North for the plaintiff and I'm here with my co-counsel, Amy

Bradley.

MS. BRADLEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MS. SHERIDAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Ann Sheridan, Assistant Attorney General representing University of Maryland, College Park and defendants, Grace Karmiol and Angela Nastase. Ms. Nastase is here with me as well.

THE COURT: Okay, good afternoon.

MS. SHERIDAN: Good afternoon.

MR. BEASLEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Ben Beasley on behalf of defendant number three. Last name B-e-a-s-l-e-y.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. CONDLIFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jack

Condliff on behalf of defendant number two who is seated to my

right.

THE COURT: Okay, good afternoon to all of you.

All right, so pending before the Court are two motions:
The first is the University's Motion to Dismiss at ECF 52 and
the second is defendant number two's Motion for Summary
Judgment at ECF 58.

Let me just say in advance, I really appreciate your time today. I have a lot of questions. This is a very, very difficult case and very important case.

And so with that, let me start with the University and your argument. Ms. Sheridan, you can either stay seated or move to the podium. It's up to you, but please speak very clearly into the microphone so I can hear you.

MS. SHERIDAN: Thank you, Your Honor. I would like to go to the podium, if that's okay.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. SHERIDAN: Thank you, Your Honor. We have moved to dismiss based on 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim because John Doe is urging this Court to impose on the University a new type of Title IX liability not previously recognized by any Court. Mr. Doe's theory represents an extension of Title IX liability not contemplated by the University when it's accepted Title IX funds. And I see the Court's puzzled look and I'll explain why this is.

THE COURT: No, I think I know why you say that. I mean, your pleadings push very hard on the Court's rationale in Nungesser. And it seems as if the University is wrapping

itself in that decision in terms of if I allow this claim to go forward to discovery here, then any exonerated person accused of rape suddenly has a cause of action. That was stated more than once I think in the pleadings and I think that's what you mean, but tell me if I'm wrong.

want to start by saying, I mean, what's different here is that typically when a respondent is challenging what the University has done with respect to Title IX, it's about the process. And here there's no question that Mr. Doe received a fair process that was not -- I mean, it resulted in his favor. He cannot have any complaints about that. But at the conclusion of the process, he is now indicating that the University's obligations to him under Title IX extend to silencing his accuser and her supporters. But the Department of Education regulation --

THE COURT: Is that what the complaint really says?

I mean, isn't the complaint saying -- it pleads all of the fact-specific circumstances surrounding the underlying Title

IX hearing and process of which I think it's fair to impute it all to the University. You knew it, it's your process, right?

I'm not sure yet even how much it necessarily matters other than what we learn from it, is this all arose from a sexual encounter between a woman and a man. The woman accused the man of rape. It went to a hearing. He was exonerated. Then that

same woman in association with a student association that is alleged to be very close to the university's Title IX office -- because it's not just the complainant, the person who says she was raped. It's also the two leaders of the PSA who then take the next step to say, "John Doe is a rapist.

John Doe is still on campus under investigation." And that was directed at an organization to which John Doe has belonged for a long, long time.

And John Doe is not asking for the University to silence that. John Doe is alleging that the University had very specific complaints made and did -- not only did nothing, but in the interactions with John Doe essentially said, "Well the complainant made those allegations in good faith and she perceived John Doe as a perpetrator of a sexual offense against her." I mean, that was -- according to the complaint, that was your agent's words.

So the Title IX office at that time, they're in it. They're in the middle of this. But they're not asked to silence anybody, they're just asked to investigate a complaint.

MS. SHERIDAN: Well, they were asked to treat this as a complaint regarding sexual harassment. And it did not meet the definition of sexual harassment. I mean, as a preliminary matter --

THE COURT: Why is it not based on sex?

Well, before we even get to sex, I 1 MS. SHERIDAN: 2 don't think you can even characterize it as harassment because 3 it wasn't directed at Mr. Doe. This is speech that one group 4 of students --5 THE COURT: It says John Doe -- wait, let's go in order, okay? You make these arguments in order and I would 6 7 really like to do it in order because again, this is so 8 important to you, to the University, to Mr. Doe, to the 9 complainants, to the good people who are here. 10 MS. SHERIDAN: I agree. 11 THE COURT: I'm not interested in making a mistake 12 of law or fact, frankly. And I think the problem with a lot of 13 these cases is that they come on a Motion to Dismiss and 14 motions sometimes get the best of folks. And it is written in 15 a way that is not as careful as we need to be in these 16 circumstances. So I'm really trying hard to be very careful in 17 my words and I'd like to go through this with you in the order 18 in which you raise it, if that's okay, so that I understand 19 fully your arguments. 20 MS. SHERIDAN: Yes, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay. 22 I mean, as far as the initial prong MS. SHERIDAN: 23 is whether it constitutes sexual harassment.

MS. SHERIDAN: And as an initial matter, it's not at

THE COURT: Correct, yes.

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all clear that this is harassment as defined by the Department
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       of Education. I mean, harassment as defined by the Department
       of Education regs is unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature.
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       Unwelcome -- which typically is unwelcome sexual advances,
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       requests for sexual favors.
                 THE COURT: Right. But Jennings in the Fourth
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       Circuit says, "Sexual harassment occurs when the victim is
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       subjected to sex-specific language that is aimed to
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       humiliate." And then there's other words, "humiliate,
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       degradate." So --
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                 MS SHERIDAN: And certainly that's true with respect
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       to not only with Jennings, but Feminist Majority. But in
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       those cases, the speech was directed at the plaintiff.
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                 THE COURT: But here the speech is directed at the
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       plaintiff. "John Doe is a rapist" -- to his club, to the club
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       that he belonged.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: It was directed to third parties.
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       Okay, I see the Court's not buying that. Okay.
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                 THE COURT: I'm confused.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: But the harassment is basically, "I'm
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       threatening you. I'm calling you names to your face." It's
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       not that I'm telling rumors about you to somebody else. I
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       mean, that's -- harassment is conduct speech directed at you.
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       Threats made against you.
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                 THE COURT: So if I threaten -- if I threaten you
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through someone else, it's not harassment? If I say, "You are a rapist" and the consequences of that is that the third-party takes adverse action against you in a manner designed to humiliate or degrade the person, that's not actionable?

MS. SHERIDAN: Well, it might be actionable. I don't know if it's actionable under Title IX. But let me move onto whether it's sex-based or not.

THE COURT: Yeah, that's where I thought you were really living in your pleadings.

MS. SHERIDAN: What's really important here is, I mean, first of all, "rapist" is not a gender term. Although the traditional definition of rape involves penetration of a vagina by a penis, modern definitions of rape have been expanded so that a woman can be a rapist. A man can be a rape victim. So the use of that term in and of itself does not make it sexual harassment.

THE COURT: And I agree with you. I don't think as in the plaintiff in *Nungesser* maybe overstated the claim and it caused, I think, the Court to have to perhaps wrestle with the concept that it's not necessary. It's not necessary to find that the term "rapist" is inherently gendered. Because this is all very fact-bound and the facts of this case are that it arose — the accusations, the hearing, it arose out of a sexual encounter between a man and a woman in that context where the woman said it was rape. And there was a whole

hearing about it in which the accused was exonerated according to the complaint, right? And now stemming from that there's not just calling him a rapist, but a series of events that take place. And the argument isn't being made that it's inherently gendered, but rather that in this context it is, in part, because Doe is named. That's how I'm reading it.

MS. SHERIDAN: Right. And I don't see any specific facts supporting that allegation that it was because he was male as opposed to because he was a respondent.

THE COURT: Are you saying there are no allegations?

There's nothing in the complaint from which I can draw --

MS. SHERIDAN: There are only conclusory allegations saying that. But there's no -- there's no allegations regarding anybody's statements to anybody from which you can draw that conclusion. It's really just speculative.

THE COURT: How about the conversation that took place toward -- there's the point at which Jane Roe was put on the executive committee of the PSA. She announces it on social media in February of 2022. She says that she was raped by two boys. And in the same media event she says no girl needs to wake up with her pants undone. That prompts another complaint by Mr. Roe in which he alleges to have a conversation with Ms. Nastase in which Ms. Nastase then says she perceived Doe as a perpetrator of a sexual offense against Roe.

So all of this is very wrapped up in each other. It is

not just about a rape, it's a girl and a boy and this woman accusing this man of rape.

And here's my question to you: When the table is turned and we have other cases in which a woman makes a complaint and then there are allegations of similar disparaging, insulting, humiliating comments, we don't go through this attempt to parse out what part of it is because the complainant is a woman, the plaintiff is a woman and what part of it is because she is complaining about rape. And I'm thinking about East Haven, I'm thinking about Rouse, right? I mean, we're going through this analysis here to try to disaggregate them and I'm not sure why.

MS. SHERIDAN: Your Honor, in those instances, those cases that Your Honor is referring to, it was clear that the harassment, the conduct that was complained about was in response to the person making the report. You know, so the person makes -- the woman makes a report of a sexual assault that she was raped and then there's direct retaliation. And those cases it was never -- it was never argued that, you know, that it was anything other than retaliation.

Here, there's no link between the speech that occurred here and his defense of himself in the Title IX proceeding.

THE COURT: Why isn't that plausible from the complaint? The complaint lays out this protracted evidentiary hearing where he had to defend himself against -- at least

according to the complaint -- allegations ultimately proven false that went on for months. And that as soon as that's over, the allegations that form the subject of the Title IX claim begin.

MS. SHERIDAN: Well, I mean, temporal proximity may be an appropriate --

THE COURT: But it's subject matter proximity too. I mean, it's the same parties. It's the same sexual encounter.

It's the same --

MS. SHERIDAN: I think what Your Honor is suggesting is that any time, any time a claimant loses a Title IX process and continues to engage in speech, that it's a Title IX issue.

this conversation today because I want to be crystal clear about what I'm saying and what I am not saying. I'm pushing back because I think you are disaggregating the facts. And at the Motion to Dismiss stage, I don't believe that that is proper. If I deny your motion, it is not a floodgates moment by any stretch, because these facts are one, it's inherently fact-bound. Two, these facts are not any facts. Every case comes to the Court on its own legs. And what I don't want to have happen is by deciding this in a Motion to Dismiss, we end up setting law that is really not on all fours with where we should be.

And I'm talking about Nungesser. I disagree with

Nungesser. I think that it sets up this dichotomist variable that does not exist in the law. It is not one motive or another. And in Nungesser, the problem that I have with Nungesser is the Court found that the only allegation that was made plausible is that it was a -- the subsequent allegations made to Nungesser were based on a personal vendetta. And it was personal animus, not arising from any sort of sex-based motivation.

And the problem that I have with that is I don't think I have to pick one or the other. If the facts make plausible that it's more than one or both and it's a very fact-bound analysis, then I have to stay with the facts here. And so I'm really going to push back if you say "Well, Judge, if you deny dismissal here, that means, you know, anyone who is exonerated now has a claim." No.

MS. SHERIDAN: I think, Your Honor, that universities already have difficulty as it is navigating Title IX. And I think that they are ill-equipped to adjudicate defamation claims. And that is exactly what the Court is asking them to do.

THE COURT: Can I ask you a question about that?

Can I ask you about that? What's the University policy on conduct, including words and actions taken against a person who is accused of sexual misconduct? What is your policy on that? So the process just hypothetically I just want to

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understand the contours. The process is going on. One student makes allegations against another. Title IX office gets involved. There is an investigation and a hearing and no decision has been made yet. In that first phase, what is the University's policy on how other students may or may not behave toward the accused? MS. SHERIDAN: Well, first of all the process itself is protected under FERPA. It's not -- it's not a process that's, you know, that is broadcast to everybody on campus. I mean --THE COURT: I know. I get that. Let me try to make it even simpler. The accuser, the complainant starts spreading the word to the PSA and to other organizations in which the accused belongs. "He's my rapist." "He raped me." And the process is still going on. MS. SHERIDAN: In order to interfere with the process.

THE COURT: Well, I don't know. That's what the person does. What is the University's policy in that regard? Do you take any action against the accuser? That's phase 1. And then phase 2 is what policy do you have once the case is adjudicated? If the case is adjudicated one way or another, do you have any sort of policy on what individuals involved in that process can and cannot do?

MS. SHERIDAN: May I confer with my --

Sure, of course. 1 THE COURT: 2 So unfortunately, the Department of MS. SHERIDAN: Education regulations and our policy which mirrors that 3 4 basically provide that the exercise of rights protected under the First Amendment do not constitute retaliation under Title 5 IX. So the University is not in a position to regulate speech. 6 7 THE COURT: But you didn't make that argument in 8 your pleadings. 9 MS. SHERIDAN: Sorry? THE COURT: You didn't make that argument in the 10 11 pleadings, right? 12 MS. SHERIDAN: Your Honor, we did cite to that reg 13 in our reply. 14 THE COURT: See, what I'm trying to get at is assume 15 for a moment it's not protected speech and it involves 16 allegations of --17 MS. SHERIDAN: But Your Honor, that's the rug is 18 assume -- because the University -- you're putting the 19 University in a position of determining whether something is 20 protected speech or not. They're not First Amendment experts. 21 They are not in a position to figure out who has privilege to 22 say what and to do that type of adjudication. That's for 23 courts to do. 24 THE COURT: But then why didn't you make that 25 argument in your motion, in your first motion when the

plaintiff is alleging on four or five separate occasions, "I went to the office, the Title IX office. I told them that the accuser was now saying, 'I'm her rapist' and going to my clubs and then my club is now kicking me off," right? Why isn't argument there --

MS. SHERIDAN: I'm sorry, I thought I was making that argument and it certainly was not explicit enough.

THE COURT: Well, what page is it on? Because I literally -- we have gone through your argument, like that's why I wanted to do this step by step because I wanted to know exactly where the University stood on this and I didn't see a First Amendment argument.

MS. SHERIDAN: I mean, that's essentially the -- you know, that's what our reliance on *Nungesser* was and I'm sorry if we did not --

THE COURT: Nungesser isn't a First Amendment argument, though. It's the argument in Nungesser is this isn't sex-based. It was a personal vendetta. It was personal animus and personal animus is not protected. It's not sex-based conduct. That was Nungesser. So now you're throwing at me the First Amendment and I'm just trying to figure out what's the baseline University policy when you've got --

MS. SHERIDAN: We can't regulate speech in that way.

I mean, we can regulate -- we can try to issue some type of -something to the Office of Student Conduct if there is conduct

that's threatening or trying to keep somebody from participating in the process.

THE COURT: Yeah, I mean, I was just about to ask you, we can think of all kinds of speech that's really offensive and humiliating and degrading.

MS. SHERIDAN: True.

woman your argument would not be, "We can't get involved because it's speech." Right? I mean, if a student comes and says "Listen, my professor is making all kinds of comments about my parts and about what" -- you know, just take Jennings. Take the facts in Jennings. All that coach did was talk.

MS. SHERIDAN: I know, but here's the difference between Jennings and this case: Jennings involved a coach and it involved somebody who was part of the University. He was somebody over whom the University had an employment relationship. It's a much -- I mean, that -- Davis, Davis actually exhibits a much higher, more stringent standard for deliberate indifference to student-on-student conduct.

THE COURT: So you're saying if it were a student who made all those comments and persisted in those comments and the student who was getting the comments comes to the office and says, "He keeps saying, you know, awful things about my body and about my parts and asking all of these

intimate questions." Your position is, we can't get involved? 1 2 MS. SHERIDAN: No, no, no. That's not my position at all. But I think that there's a difference between whether 3 4 something permits a Title IX response versus whether something 5 constitutes deliberate indifference. And I think if you look at what occurred here and you look at the timeline of actually 6 7 what is alleged, I mean, it's alleged that the Title IX 8 process concluded in September in Mr. Doe's favor. A few weeks 9 later, Mr. Doe -- Ms. Roe's friends told the lacrosse team 10 president that he was a rapist under investigation. And the 11 team cancelled a party scheduled to occur at his apartment. 12 And then in December, Defendants 2 and 3, again, told the 13 lacrosse team's president, "Doe was a rapist under 14 investigation" and Mr. Doe was prohibited from attending a lacrosse team event that month. 15 16 THE COURT: Okay. 17 MS. SHERIDAN: At that point he files a formal Title 18 IX complaint. I mean, you know, this is not the type of --19 first of all, it's not clearly gendered and it's not clearly 20 retaliatory. It's not the type of conduct that does require a 21 Title IX response. I mean --22 THE COURT: But did you respond? I mean, part of 23 what is a little bit tricky here is you're picking out some 24 facts. 25 MS. SHERIDAN: Well, I'm picking out the only facts

that are specified in the complaint, because there's a lot of conclusory facts in there.

THE COURT: No, there's actually -- there is a timeline that is pleaded and I'm sure the plaintiff will walk me through it if I don't walk it through with you, but that September, the hearing was concluded. By October, Mr. Doe is complaining. Then --

MS. SHERIDAN: That's not clear from --

THE COURT: That first complaint is in December, right? Where defendant Karmiol gets involved. She is in the Title IX office. She hears the complaint. She does not say it doesn't belong here or we can't do anything. Defendant Karmiol says she'll instruct PSA to stop harassing Doe. That's what paragraph 84 says. Then she says she needs -- she will also do it protecting Doe's name, right? And then decides that -- and understood and agreed why she won't use his name and then decides that she can't do that and communicates that to him.

So again, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, today you're saying that Title IX, the office has no business in this. This is protected speech and you shouldn't even be involved. But the complaint says you were involved. Your people actively participated in the complaints and they went from October to December and then we have January and then February.

MS. SHERIDAN: Well, I mean, we can stay involved to

the extent that we can refer them to other supportive services. Like the complaint alleged that Ms. Nastase did in May when there was an encounter between Mr. Doe and Ms. Roe and her boyfriend and where he was threatened. I mean, the complaint alleges that Ms. Nastase properly referred that to Office of Student Conduct to see whether there had been a violation of the no contact order that was in place between the parties. And so the Title IX office can get involved in that way. It doesn't mean that it triggers a Title IX investigation, a full-fledged investigation.

THE COURT: I understand that, but this is in response to you picking certain facts out and saying there's no deliberate indifference, right? I mean, that's the conversation that we were on.

MS. SHERIDAN: Yeah.

THE COURT: And here there's -- there are facts pled that there was actual knowledge of what Mr. Doe perceived as the retaliatory and harassing conduct.

MS. SHERIDAN: But Your Honor, that's where I think that you're reading into the complaint because I don't see any link linking it to retaliation. It's not --

THE COURT: Well then you're moving on to retaliation. I want to stay with the harassment just for a moment. I want to understand your argument with regard to harassment. Your first order of argument is he was not subject

to sexual harassment because it just doesn't meet the definition. And you rely on *Nungesser* for that. Then you say, it wasn't severe and pervasive. Then you say, no facts support deliberate indifference, just on the harassment before we move to retaliation.

MS. SHERIDAN: Okay.

THE COURT: So on deliberate indifference, why aren't the number of times that Mr. Doe went and made a complaint -- if I accept that it's sexual harassment just for the purpose of this argument and he complains about it to the Title IX office on the numerous occasions that are in the complaint, why wouldn't that be enough of actual knowledge coupled with the decision not to do anything about it --

MS. SHERIDAN: Is it something that was clearly sexual harassment, though? I mean, I think that there's -- that Title IX officials have to be given the breathing room to make these close calls in gray areas. And I don't think that the Davis court ever expected that those decisions would be turned over to a jury to second guess.

THE COURT: But why then in Feminist Majority was that enough?

MS. SHERIDAN: Because in Feminist Majority there was no question but that it was sex-based and it was retaliatory. That was not argued.

THE COURT: But that was different, though. I mean,

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       it wasn't argued and the Fourth Circuit was like, of course it
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       is because --
                 MS. SHERIDAN: Well, it clearly was, but it wasn't
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       based on the gender dynamics. It was based on these women made
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       a report to the administration.
                 THE COURT: Right.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: About the men's conduct fostering
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       sexual assaults, increased sexual assaults on campus. And in
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       response, in direct response to those complaints and to
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       raising these issues to everybody's attention, they were
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       subjected to over 700 direct threats of graphic sexual
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       violence. That's a very different situation than this one.
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                 THE COURT: But is it because in number or is it --
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: It's not only in number, it's because
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       the intent was so evident. The intent was to shut them down,
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       to stop them from speaking.
                 THE COURT: And here --
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                 MS. SHERIDAN:
                               And here --
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                 THE COURT: --what is pleaded is the intent was to
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       get him off campus; to rid the campus of predators and to get
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       him off of at least with regard to the lacrosse team. I mean,
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       sure, it's not nearly as --
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: Right, but also as -- I mean, the
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       genesis of these complaints is his conduct, not because he
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       defended himself. I mean, regardless of how --
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                 THE COURT:
                            How do you separate that out?
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       said the genesis of all this is his conduct.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN:
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                 THE COURT: What conduct are you speaking of?
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                 MS. SHERIDAN:
                                I mean, he definitely had a sexual
       encounter with this woman and she -- he believes it was
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       consensual and she believes it wasn't.
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                 THE COURT: Okay. And a finder of fact after a
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       hearing process that you as the University give him, concluded
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       that --
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: -- that his version was more
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       believable than hers. That was one.
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                 THE COURT: It all stems from a sexual encounter,
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              So now why when there's subsequent activity based on
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       not only the sexual encounter but the process, why is it now
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       suddenly devoid of any sex-based intent? You wouldn't be
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       saying that when Ms. Roe accused Mr. Doe of rape, that that
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       wasn't sex-based, right?
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: When she accused him of rape was that
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       sex-based?
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                 THE COURT: Yeah, was it -- if the University --
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                 MS. SHERIDAN:
                                She was accusing him of rape not
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       because he was a man, she was accusing him of rape because of
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       the conduct.
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                 THE COURT: Okay.
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So he's not being targeted because of
         MS. SHERIDAN:
his gender. He's being targeted because of the perceived
conduct. That's how Ms. Roe perceived the encounter. And, you
know, somebody could go to a Title IX process and be very --
it doesn't mean that it didn't happen. It doesn't mean that
she wasn't raped.
         THE COURT: I understand that and I'm not suggesting
that. You see, this is why this case is so important because
emotions run incredibly high for everybody involved. And I'm
trying to take that out of it and really understand the
analysis here.
         MS. SHERIDAN: I think the Court is really putting
the University in a difficult position if we're going to have
to regulate speech following the process.
          THE COURT: Well let me ask you this then: Doesn't
it make sense if that's the argument, to make the argument
square on in the pleadings?
         MS. SHERIDAN: I should have, Your Honor. I should
have.
         THE COURT: Yes, that's one. And two, if we're
really going to do this issue justice for the University --
         MS. SHERIDAN:
                        Yes.
          THE COURT: --as well as all of the students, right
now I've got to tell you, it's my firm view I need some
discovery. I'm not -- and I do not want to write on this
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assuming facts that are not developed, that may not be accurate, that don't really squarely address the University's primarily concern about why this case is outside of the Title IX context, right? That's a very, very vexing place for a Court to be because as we see, cases that were written ten years ago or five years ago don't seem to square with the jurisprudence now. And often in a Motion to Dismiss stage, that's when the mistakes happen, if that makes sense. MS. SHERIDAN: That does make sense to me, Your So if I could shift gears slightly --THE COURT: Sure. MS. SHERIDAN: -- to the Cummings argument which is that the complaint hasn't alleged anything here other than emotional distress damages. It hasn't alleged --THE COURT: I thought that they took that out and now alleged damages and argue under Mercer if it's nominal, then we get attorneys' fees, but at least this is a toehold into the damages world that Cummings really doesn't treat. I know you say that --MS. SHERIDAN: It doesn't treat it square on, but it does indicate that you have to have economic damages. THE COURT: Well, you have to have damage that would lead to an award of nominal damages, right? MS. SHERIDAN: I don't think that that's what Cummings indicates.

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Well, Cummings is about emotional THE COURT: I mean, you literally say in your reply that damages, right? it overrules Mercer. And I don't see it because it was about emotional damages and Mercer was about if all you have is you get the instruction on nominal damages and the jury agrees and says there's nominal damages, then you can get attorneys' fees. So I'm not sure --MS. SHERIDAN: Okay, I don't read Cummings that way, Your Honor. If I could shift --**THE COURT:** How do you read it? Well, that basically Title IX is --MS. SHERIDAN: what you get in Title IX are contract-like damages which are economic damages. And I don't think like in a breach of contract, there's no entitlement to nominal damages. And it's why, you know, it's why you don't get punitive damages either under Title IX. These are damages that only would come up in the context of a breach of contract. So that's how I read Cummings. THE COURT: So you're reading Cummings broadly to say that it eliminates nominal damages? MS. SHERIDAN: For Title IX cases, yes. THE COURT: And that's based on --MS. SHERIDAN: That's based on the construct that you can only get the types of damages you could get in a

breach of contract action which are economic damages, they're

1 not nominal damages. 2 THE COURT: Okay. 3 MS. SHERIDAN: And so I'd like to shift gears again, 4 Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Sure. And that is to the claims against the 6 MS. SHERIDAN: individual defendants, Ms. Karmiol and Ms. Nastase. Because I 7 8 really do believe that given Your Honor has indicated it's a 9 murky area and it's a difficult area, that they're entitled to 10 qualified immunity under these particular facts, that there 11 was no clearly established right. 12 THE COURT: Except that's a defense, right? That's 13 an affirmative defense. MS. SHERIDAN: But it's an affirmative defense that 14 15 should be decided at the earliest moment that the Court can. 16 And there's just nothing in Feminist Majority that puts them 17 on notice that this type of speech, speech made from one 18 individual to -- one group of students to another group of 19 students about the complainant that is not clearly related to 20 gender, is not clearly retaliatory, that that required them to

THE COURT: So you're saying on the equal protection claim they're entitled to qualified immunity even though that's a slightly different -- I mean, yes, it involves --

do anything other than what they did. And, you know --

MS. SHERIDAN: Yes. And --

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-- a Feminist Majority theory, but also
          THE COURT:
on this case, this claim alleges there was one process for Ms.
Roe and one process for Mr. Doe. And if you -- if, if in the
end of the day I find that the process for Mr. Doe involved a
claim of sexual harassment that was known and not acted upon.
         MS. SHERIDAN: Yeah, but you have to look at whether
Mr. Doe and Ms. Roe were similarly situated.
         THE COURT: Okay.
                        And Ms. Roe's complaint is something
         MS. SHERIDAN:
that we can all agree clearly fell within Title IX. It was a
complaint of sexual assault.
         THE COURT: I understand that.
         MS. SHERIDAN: But his claim, it's one of defamation
essentially.
          THE COURT: But until we get the facts on that,
right? So say it ends up being --
         MS. SHERIDAN: But in terms of the facts that were
alleged. And --
          THE COURT: I understand that. But again, if I'm
going to be careful on the sexual harassment piece, then I'm
going to be equally careful on equal protection. Because it
all -- you all said it in your pleadings, it largely rises and
falls on the same theory. And there are allegations pled that
there was one process for Ms. Doe and one process for Mr. Roe.
If you're right and the facts demonstrate that this is not
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sexual harassment, this is defamation.

MS. SHERIDAN: But I don't see how they're similarly situated.

THE COURT: But the point is the facts that are going to be generated will answer that question. Plausibly, plausibly Mr. Doe has averred that these comments were directed, they were at least in part sex-based. Because "no girl should have to" have her -- "wake up with her pants undone." "I was raped by two boys." "I'm going to tell your club that you are a rapist." "The Title IX office is going to hear the complaints and direct accordingly" based off again, the allegations that Ms. Roe was believed. That's how it reads, most favorably to the plaintiff.

So if I can't find as a matter of law right now with comfort that the claims are to be dismissed because they're not sex-based, then how can I make the decision they're not similarly situated? How can I do that if I don't answer the first question?

MS. SHERIDAN: Because one type of complaint is clearly sex-based. The other one is in a much -- I mean, if it is at all. And I know that Your Honor is drawing all the inferences in favor of the plaintiff as you're required to do, but is in a much different category. So the fact that they were treated differently, that one received a full process and one was screened out has to do with the nature of the

complaints themselves and not with the gender of the complainants.

THE COURT: But it wasn't just screened out. The allegations are it was screened out because the persons in authority in the Title IX office communicated after the case was done that well, Ms. Roe complained of good faith. So in other words, we can't do anything without --

MS. SHERIDAN: But I don't see how that's evidence of discriminatory animus to say that the initial complaint was made in good faith. I don't see in the context of --

THE COURT: When he's coming to say "She continues to call me a rapist to the people who are now kicking me out of a club that I belonged to for the last four years," that context. Why is that a response that does not indicate a disparate treatment? Like in other words, the plaintiff is saying, draw from this, Judge, that there should have at least been a conversation that was started off similarly to the first one that we had which is, we'll talk to PSA. We'll tell them to stop harassing you, right? Why did it devolve from there? And then it was, but we're not going to protect your identity and then we're not going to talk to them if we can't tell them who you are. And then we take what Ms. Roe says in good faith and that Roe took these actions not because she was harassing and retaliating you, but because she believed you raped her.

I mean again, why am I not at this stage giving the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiff?

MS. SHERIDAN: Because these are difficult decisions and the Title IX coordinator shouldn't be having to defend individual claims against them for making difficult decisions in gray areas. That's exactly what qualified immunity is supposed to do.

THE COURT: And at least in the Feminist Majority
there is a platform for complaining about student-on-student
sexual harassment, so if this is sexual harassment --

MS. SHERIDAN: If, but that's the big if and that's why it falls within qualified immunity. If the Court, if we have to engage in discovery for the Court to make that determination, I'm not sure how a Title IX officer could be on notice that this was somehow discriminatory.

THE COURT: Well, my first question to you is -- one of the questions, what policies do you have? What procedures do you have? I can't get an answer on that. So yes, there might be a little bit of discovery on that because I don't know the answer. And that answer matters with regard to knowledge and deliberate indifference. And frankly, I don't see from a practical perspective if there's going to be discovery on the facts, then it's going to overlap with both claims because like the conversation we're having, right, it rises and falls on at least what are the facts? And then how

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close is it to being clearly established. It may not be
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       clearly established. You may win at the end of the day.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN:
                                Thank you, Your Honor. I understand
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       your position.
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                 THE COURT: And so I'm clear when I talk to the
       plaintiff, this is not an easy decision. This is actually a
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       decision, again, aimed at making sure when I finally put pen
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       to paper, that we've got enough to give both sides some
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       clarity and some certainty so that whoever appeals me, there
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       is a record by which the Court can really nail down these
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       important -- these are critical issues for the University. I
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       fully recognize that.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: Understood. And I have to say I was
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       somewhat constrained by the four corners of the complaint.
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                 THE COURT: Right.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: I did debate whether to expand this
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       and make this more like -- or in the alternative, Summary
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       Judgment and so here we are.
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                 THE COURT: And on that note, Ms. Sheridan -- I'll
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       speak to the plaintiffs about this in a moment. As you
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       probably already figured out, I'm largely inclined to deny the
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       motion, but for Count Five. There is no ex parte on here and
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       really, when you get up, just keep that in mind.
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                 MS. SHERIDAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Yes.
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                 THE COURT: Right, there's an alternative universe
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in which the student is graduated, that dog is not going to hunt. But what I am envisioning is that we would then talk about in advance, perhaps in a recorded conference, what discovery is going to look like. Because this is not going to be, you know, a frolic for the plaintiffs and that needs to be proportionate to the issues. What we have to deal with is this case on these facts. I know it probably sounds to the court reporter like I'm speaking in code, but I want to be clear that I'm going to take an active role in discovery so that it's not what I think the University is concerned about. Am I getting that right, Ms. Sheridan? MS. SHERIDAN: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. We are worried about extra burdens, for sure. THE COURT: I can understand that. MS. SHERIDAN: Thank you. **THE COURT:** Okay. Mr. Bradley? MR. NORTH: Thank you, Your Honor. Benjamin North. THE COURT: North. You know, it's funny. I said it and I was like, "That's not right." But I read it and it was here. I didn't want to call you Benjamin, but Ms. Smith has you as I guess Mr. and Mrs. Bradley. Mr. North, I'm sorry. That's quite all right, Your Honor. MR. NORTH:

stuttering disability, so it just might take me a bit longer

Just before I begin my argument, I just want to inform the

Court of a couple of things. The first is that I have a

than my colleague on the other side to argue. 1 THE COURT: No problem. MR. NORTH: The second thing is as you might be able 3 to tell, I have allergies or a bad cold or something so I'd just ask the Court to bear with me on that front, as well.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. They're cleaning in the court and it smells like bleach. So I'm sorry if it's aggravating you. No worries, you take your time.

MR. NORTH: I can't really smell it anyway, so no worries.

THE COURT: Okav.

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MR. NORTH: But beginning with my argument, in the interest of not taking up too much of the Court's time, I just wanted to address what I consider to be a few key points in this argument today.

The first is clarifying the pleadings standard under Title IX considering Sheppard, Twombly and Davis; the second is responding to the defendants' arguments that the harassment here was not plausibly on the basis of sex which the Court has shown an interest in during defendants' arguments; and the third is whether the University here plausibly acted clearly unreasonably in light of the known circumstances.

Of course if the Court would like me to address another area, I'm happy to do that.

THE COURT: Well, do you agree that it largely rises

and falls, the harassment, the retaliation, although I think that the University raises a good point. I'm not really sure whether under any set of facts there could be retaliation based on your client's participation in the Title IX process, but at this stage I just, I can't. I can't say that as a matter of law, right, there's nothing, there's no plausible version of the facts in which he was not retaliated by Roe and others because of that process and his defense of himself. But it's a novel theory and in the end, I don't know if that's going to prevail. I just need more facts.

But would you agree -- I guess the larger point is would you agree that essentially it all comes down to whether the facts make plausible that the harassment and retaliation is sex-based?

MR. NORTH: I think that's right, Your Honor. And I think the keyword there is "plausible." This kind of gets into the first point I was hoping to cover, but the pleading standard here ever since <code>Twombly/Iqbal</code> is that a complaint must state the claim early and that it's plausible on its face. It doesn't need to disprove, same context as Title IX, other potential reasons for why the defendant acted the way they did.

So for example, that the harassment was on the basis of sex. What the pleading standard requires is the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to make it plausible that the

harassment was on the basis of sex. It does not require plaintiffs to disprove other possible reasons for the harassment.

So I would agree with Your Honor that at the pleading stage, I think that the plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to show that sex was one plausible reason for the harassment.

THE COURT: And precisely in your complaint what would you point to?

MR. NORTH: What I would point to -- and Your Honor has already gone into this with the defendant, is that this is an accusation of rape. It all comes down to -- it all relates back to a sexual encounter. Of course sexual encounters have to do with sex. That's the first thing I would say is that an accusation of sexual misconduct is obviously on the basis of sex.

The second thing I would say is that in the context of what was going on on campus during this case, context being that the underlying Title IX process had just resolved and that immediately thereafter the complainant in that case and defendants 2 and 3 engage -- and what I should say they're all female -- against my client who is a male -- they all engage in a concerted campaign to call him a rapist. And again, a rapist, that's an act that has something to do with sex, obviously. And I think in the context of -- in the context of -- what an accusation of rape means I should say, I think it's

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speech on the basis of sex in the same way that what some of the cases we've cited are. And I know I said that very sloppily, but let me kind of explain here.

Of course rape, the term "rapist" is a sex-mutual word. Of course I concede that. But to take defendants' arguments to limit the Title IX claim to only sex-specific language would unduly constrain the purpose of Title IX and actually seems to contradict some of the cases that they cited. For example, Feminist Majority Foundation as defendants themselves argued just a moment ago, Feminist Majority Foundation concerned threats of physical and sexual violence which, of course, threats of physical and sexual violence are not themselves limited to only men and women. A man can be threatened by rape, a woman can be threatened by rape. There's nothing about that threat inherently just looking at the words that is limited to one sex or another. But of course the act in the threat does relate to sex. And that in the same way an accusation of being a rapist relates to sex. So I think again, it's just plausible that this is harassment on the basis of sex. The Court does not need to find that it's not harassment on the basis of some other factor, it just needs to find for the moment as plausible.

THE COURT: In trying to really drill down on this what does it mean to be on the basis of sex, I do think it's a different context. But the high court has given some guidance

on this in Bostock dealing with that very question of how do we define sex. And making it clear that your burden is not to show, again, one -- that there's only one motive, but that it is -- or not even a primary motive, but a motive on the basis of sex. And I found that to be instructive because where some of these other cases don't -- the real work is going to be to define the contours here because the fact of the matter is this is a person who is accused of rape who is now saying they're the victim of sex-based harassment and that's just taking this whole area of the law in a different direction. Right? But when it was in the more traditional direction which is a woman either being discriminated against because she complained about rape or a woman saying -- the victim of sex-based violent speech, it didn't require the same searching analysis. Does that make sense?

MR. NORTH: Yes. I think there are a couple points there, Your Honor. But the first -- but yes, to address I guess your last point first, I do think that makes sense. I definitely acknowledge we're in kind of a -- I wouldn't necessarily say unique totally factual circumstance when it comes to a deliberate indifference claim. And the reason I say wouldn't totally consider it unique is because still here we have a complainant complaining to the University and the University chose to do nothing about the complaints. So in that sense, of course --

THE COURT: But the University would say because it's not Title IX actionable. I mean, that's why I wanted to have the conversation with Ms. Sheridan about, well, you didn't just do nothing. You did do something, but then you chose to do nothing. In other words, why did the University Title IX office get involved at all?

But to answer more their point and I know I am bouncing around and I'm sorry, but my monkey brain just went to their point which is what's the limiting principle? What's the reason that this isn't going -- this case isn't going to open up the floodgates for any accuser, accused rather, who is exonerated to now say well, they're talking about me on campus. Therefore Title IX, do something.

MR. NORTH: Yes. I think that's a great question and I have a couple of responses for that. The first thing is just to address I guess the plain language of Your Honor's question, I don't think this would create a cause of action for every exonerated student because not every case involves allegations of rape outside of the Title IX process subsequent to the resolution of the Title IX process. So that is to say allegations made within the Title IX process are, of course, we're not saying that those -- you know, that they should have disciplined the complainant, let's say, for making the initial report to Title IX. So anything within this underlying Title IX process.

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THE COURT: You're saying it's separate.

That's, of course, the first limiting MR. NORTH: principle. The second limiting principle I would say is that, you know, this is -- there was, in fact, some sex-specific language here. It wasn't just calling John Doe a rapist, but what it was also was, you know, this language about no girl wants to wake up with her pants undone, two boys assaulted me. Girl and boy are certainly sex-specific language. So I think that given those two limiting principles, some explicitly sex-specific language and two, this speech happened after the resolution of the underlying Title IX case in which the student was exonerated in which the school, in fact, formally determined that there was no basis or to be specific I should say that it was not more likely than not that he committed a sexual offense. I kind of consider that exonerated, but I would speak more carefully, I suppose.

So I think we have the favorable resolution to the underlying Title IX process, the post-resolution speech calling him a rapist that's outside the reporting mechanism of the University, and then the explicit sex-specific language that we have by female students. So I think all of those kind of limit what is alleged to be a new cause of action here. I consider it to be a relatively straightforward deliberate indifference claim, but I do acknowledge that we're not complaining of a sexual assault and then the University

doesn't do anything about it, we're complaining about harassment, that is speech that the University doesn't do anything about it. So if that answers Your Honor's question.

THE COURT: It does.

MR. NORTH: Okay. And just to go back to an earlier question that Your Honor raised, I think that -- and this is actually my first point that I had intended to bring up was that Twombly and Iqbal maintain the plausibility standard for all pleadings except for claims of mistake or fraud that are subject to a heightened pleading standard.

And with respect to Title IX, the Fourth Circuit's recent opinion in *Sheppard* I think is instructive in that *Sheppard* held that Title IX bars all discrimination on the basis of sex and education and that a plaintiff must plausibly allege but for causation.

And as the Court hinted at, the Fourth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Court's discussion of but for causation. And the Supreme Court in that case explained that so long as the plaintiff's sex was one but for cause in that decision, that's enough to trigger the law. So I would say just to kind of brief full circle perhaps that under Sheppard's reasoning and Bostock reasoning, so long as sex was one but for cause of the harassment, that would be enough at the pleading stage to survive a Motion to Dismiss and I think we've done that.

So with that, I suppose I will turn to the last point I was intending to address today because I believe I've sufficiently covered the plausibility standard and whether the conduct was plausibly sex-based. So the last point that I was intending to cover was that defendants acted clearly and reasonably in light of the known circumstances. And John Doe alleged in the complaint that he repeatedly made all of the harassment conduct known to defendants and pleaded with them to do something and then, of course, they did nothing.

THE COURT: And if it's not sex-based, then all of the claims fail, right? If it is then we go to the next stage --

MR. NORTH: I think that is right, Your Honor.

THE COURT: --which is at least with regard to the equal protection, was it clearly established.

MR. NORTH: I think that's right, Your Honor, yes.

I think there's really no argument the University can make that if you assume it's sex-based harassment, there's really no argument that they can make that they did anything about it because they didn't do anything about it. They received reports over and over again and they chose to do nothing, even going so far as to state that the underlying report was made in good faith or the accusations were made in good faith, even though they formally determined that he was not responsible for those allegations.

So for those reasons, I'd agree with Your Honor in that the next question then would just be qualified immunity on the equal protection claims. And there I would say that of course qualified immunity is an affirmative defense. It can be resolved and most often is resolved in Summary Judgment. And I think that once the Court and the parties have had the benefit of discovery, that that would be the more appropriate place to resolve the question of qualified immunity. For these purposes, Feminist Majority did clearly hold that a university can be liable for student-on-student sexual harassment and student-on-student retaliatory harassment. So for the pleading stage, I think that's sufficient to survive qualified immunity.

THE COURT: And I think the last question I would have at this point unless what you're about to say sparks more questions is what is exactly the plausibility of the retaliatory harassment? How is it retaliation for participation in the Title IX process rather than retaliation for the outcome? I didn't even mean to set it up as an either/or. Tell me why there's enough facts in the complaint that it's retaliation based on the participation in the process.

MR. NORTH: Well, I would say a couple things. The first thing is that the harassment began very shortly after he was -- his participation ended. So there's some sort of nexus

there between the fact that he's participating and then he is subject to this harassment. So there's a temporal proximity here. But then as Your Honor indicated during my colleague's argument, there's also a subject matter proximity here in that the retaliatory harassment covers the exact same subject material as John Doe's defense of himself during the timeline process and, of course, the underlying complaint thereto.

So I think that for those reasons and I'm sure there are reasons that I've stated in my brief that I'm not recalling, we would say that it's plausible. Again, it only has to be one plausible explanation for the retaliatory -- for the harassment. So for those reasons and the reasons stated in our brief, defendants' motion should be denied. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you. Okay. So as I've indicated, this is an extremely important case. It's very difficult to call at the Motion to Dismiss stage. And that given that I really do take very seriously the plausibility standard, ECF 52 is denied as to Count One which is the student-on-student harassment claim for the reasons that we've discussed. And to be clear, I'm just -- I'm not persuaded by Nungesser. I think it's distinguishable in its facts. It's wrongly decided. 57, I'm sorry, it's ECF 57. And to decide a case of that import I think on a Motion to Dismiss standard is just not going to do it, especially in light of I do find that the Fourth Circuit standard in Jennings at least has been plausibly met here

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given the allegations that we've discussed in totality. Not just calling someone a rapist, but all the facts in the complaint. I found Rouse v. Duke University and Doe v. East Haven instructive and I quess one could say I'm pressing on my own questions as to why those cases were so easily decided when the woman was a complainant and why we struggle so much when it's the man who is the complainant with similar allegations in terms of making an allegation of rape and then having much adverse speech directed at the plaintiff in Rouse or in Doe. And it was in Doe, in fact, very easy for the case to be concluded through a trial. And for the Second Circuit to say it's certainly a reasonable juror could have found that those responses to her allegation of rape were sex-based and yet we struggle here with that. And I just need more facts to understand why it's different from the University's perspective.

So I'm going to deny dismissal of Count One on the question of whether this was sex-based harassment. It's plausible given all the facts in the complaint.

Similarly, with regard to whether the harassment was severe and pervasive, under the prevailing standard, being barred from -- or being denied access to a program or activity, being excluded from a program or activity is sufficiently severe and pervasive. That's been alleged here and so I don't see any grounds to say that there's no set of

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facts given in the light most favorable to the plaintiff that would otherwise not meet that element. So I deny the motion on that ground.

No facts to support deliberate indifference: Again, for the reasons we've discussed, it largely rises and falls on whether the conduct at issue is on the basis of sex. I think for the reasons we've discussed I can't determine that it's not. And under the plausibility standard, there are enough facts to suggest in the light most favorable to Mr. Doe that it is. And so deliberate indifference, clearly the remaining facts are that the Title IX office knew, they knew specifically what the complaints were. They took certain action, but not sufficient action certainly under Feminist Majority. And so for that reason, when the plaintiff alleges reaching out to the office on at least four occasions over the course of several months, filing two formal complaints, being told we will take certain action and then that is not taken under the facts that have been alleged, that is sufficient to constitute at this point deliberate indifference.

With regard to the retaliation claim, Count Two, for largely the same reasons I'm going to allow it to go forward. I do query whether it's going to be -- this is a different case than Feminist Majority and the claimed participation in the protected activity is different. But again, staying faithful to the Iqbal/Twombly standard, I think that there is

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enough plausibly pled that this is retaliatory harassment because of Mr. Doe's participation in the Title IX proceeding, the results, and the fallout. We'll see where we end up after Summary Judgment.

On the damages point, I have to say that I don't see Cummings as wiping out Mercer. And when I read the complaint it claims damages. It doesn't -- it actually under the prayer for relief, notes that they are claiming compensatory, special, and punitive damages. I don't believe there's any --I'm not sure -- Title IX doesn't allow for punitive damages, but there are defamation claims and that's not been really addressed. But as to damages, there have been actual damages pled. And so I don't see Cummings as just wiping the slate clean. Perhaps it reaches emotional damages. And your point, Ms. Sheridan, about it being contract-based claims may be, but that doesn't in my view negate that under Mercer, Title IX litigants may be entitled to nominal damages and the attorneys' fees that flow. So certainly you can take another shot at convincing me otherwise, but on these pleadings I don't see it.

Okay, with regard to equal protection, Count Four, similarly and in the individual capacities at this juncture I'm going to deny it for largely the same reasons. I think the different new argument that the defendants press is that it is not clearly established that the constitutional or statutory

right at issue is simply not clearly established. And that may be the winning argument after discovery, but qualified immunity is a fact-bound defense. Certainly the defendant is right. I must decide it at the earliest possible moment and I'm saying I can't decide it at this juncture, but that doesn't mean I won't after the facts are more clearly laid out.

And so given where we are in the procedural posture is largely the reason why I cannot say Count Four is barred for the personal capacity claims by qualified immunity. It may be in the end.

With respect to Count Five, the equal protection claim in Karmiol and Nastase's official capacities, I'm going to grant dismissal on that. I don't see any facts that trigger ex parte Young and otherwise as agents of the state the defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity to be protected from a suit in this court. So Count Five is dismissed and is dismissed with prejudice.

Any questions with regard to the ruling at this point? We'll talk about next steps.

MS. SHERIDAN: No thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. With regard to ECF 58 which is Defendant 2's Motion for Summary Judgment.

MR. CONDLIFF: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jack
Condliff for the Defendant 2 in this matter. I'm going to be

incredibly brief. I really don't have a lot to say about this. I did note the criticism of my motion about not having cited the cases in Summary Judgment. Quite correct, I just wasn't thinking about it at the time. I apologize to the Court.

I will also say I'm familiar with the cases cited by the plaintiffs about early Summary Judgment and the right to take discovery. I've been a plaintiff's attorney for 31 years. I know those cases by heart so I'm not going to dispute that fact, but the reason I filed this motion is a very simple one which is that Defendant 2 is the wrong person. They sued the wrong person. She wasn't there. She wasn't at any of the meetings. And as her affidavit states, she simply wasn't involved in what is being complained of here.

THE COURT: I thought that there was a response with respect to online participation. And that the complaint does not squarely state that this was only in person advocacy. As a matter of fact, social media was used and is often used. So why at this very early stage would I say in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, clearly Defendant 2 could not have participated in the alleged events?

MR. CONDLIFF: Well, I didn't see any allegations that Defendant 2 made online posts. There were online posts --

THE COURT: There were online meetings where she was -- wasn't there? I thought I read an affidavit that was

submitted by plaintiff with respect -- am I wrong about that? With respect to an online meeting.

MR. CONDLIFF: Let me go back to that, Your Honor. I have to reread -- I have it right here, at least I thought I did. That's the problem with being paperless, Your Honor, is you don't always --

THE COURT: I mean, why isn't this -- really, we're not -- we've had no discovery. You're right, it's going to be resolved with a handful of interrogatories and maybe a short deposition.

MR. CONDLIFF: I understand. I'm just concerned about my client's time and being involved in this. She has graduated. She has a job at the United Nations NGO and I'm trying to get her out of the middle of dodge. I mean, this -- Defendant 3 categorically denies the substance of the allegations, but she's not denying that they sued the person they think they were supposed to sue. Defendant 2 is saying, you just got the wrong person. You should not have sued me in this matter.

I agree it may be short discovery, but short discovery to a lawyerson and short discovery to a lawyer are two vastly different things and it is intrinsic. So that is my concern.

That's why I filed this so early. I mean, I knew the Court might reject it, but I wanted to make the point early on that with Defendant 2, she shouldn't be in this case at all.

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And it's not that Defendant 2 wasn't in
 1
                 THE COURT:
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       leadership in the PSA.
 3
                 MR. CONDLIFF: She absolutely was, but she wasn't
 4
       there.
 5
                 THE COURT: You're saying she was not on campus and
       therefore not involved in the chain of events?
 6
 7
                 MR. CONDLIFF:
                               She was at home, ill, getting taken
 8
       care of. You've got the affidavit there in front of you and I
 9
       don't want to discuss the cause here on the public record, but
10
       yeah, she was not doing well. She was instructed by her doctor
11
       not to return to campus, that it was okay to do online
12
       learning. And for these events she was not the person
13
       participating or exercising her leadership role.
14
                 THE COURT: Okay, all right. I get the argument.
15
       Let me see what the plaintiff has to say about it.
16
            Mr. North, we're told Defendant 2, wrong person.
17
                 MR. NORTH: Yes, and I appreciate opposing counsel's
18
       candor and his argument. I guess my brief response would be we
19
       don't know that she wasn't involved. I mean, she says she
20
       wasn't involved through her affidavit. We have in our
21
       affidavit and I think on page 6 of our opposition brief at
22
       least a link to one PSA meeting in which she was present and
23
       she spoke.
24
                 THE COURT: And it was online, right? Am I right
25
       about that? Wasn't it online?
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MR. NORTH: I reviewed the video this morning. The hyperlink is in footnote 4 on page 6. But I reviewed it this morning and she was physically in person. Now I don't know if that room was on campus or what, but she was sitting there in person with a group of what looked to be students. Again, I don't know beyond that, but it was a PSA meeting from what it seemed. So, you know, it's not appropriate of course for a defendant to just say hey, I wasn't involved and short-circuit litigation. It looks like at least from our investigation and from this video that she was there, she was involved and for those reasons, Summary Judgment is inappropriate.

THE COURT: Yeah, okay. Well I agree. I'm going to deny it at this juncture. Again, I'll say the same thing. I'm not interested in Mr. Condliff making anyone go through a protracted, expensive, and unnecessary discovery battle. So I'm going to keep it tight and if the defense is going to be "not me," let's get to the discovery that resolves that quickly.

MR. CONDLIFF: I don't think it's expensive for my
client. I'm pro bono, but--

THE COURT: Well, for you and I appreciate your services in that regard. But at this juncture pre-discovery where there's been sufficient showing on the plaintiff's part that it would be inappropriate to grant Summary Judgment at this juncture without additional discovery because there's at

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least some facts to suggest Defendant 2 was involved in PSA during the relevant times, I'll deny the motion.

MR. CONDLIFF: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, Counsel, let's talk next steps. Customarily what I would do is issue just a generic scheduling order and then have you all discuss and file in response that the milestone date A) joint status report. I suggest we do that but then the next -- what you file in response in that joint status report I urge you to make it a little bit more detailed and surgical with respect to what discovery you intend to exchange so that I can have a more meaningful conversation with you all. If there's going to be concern that it is far afield, it's not dealing with the issues that are squarely concerning the Court in the next stage, that we have that conversation and I'll have the follow-up, what I call the Rule 16 conference. We'll do it recorded because I would anticipate that if all is well and you say "We're all working well, we're keeping it proportionate and we're in agreement on that," well it will be a really quick conversation and we're done. If there's any concern about it then we're having a hearing on the record so we can memorialize it and go forward. So if there are any discovery disputes, we know where we started. I handle all my discovery disputes so we'll have on the record my letter order regarding discovery which basically tries to streamline the issues.

If at any point you encounter a discovery dispute that cannot be resolved by way of meet and confer, put it in a letter to me and I'll get you all on the line within a week or so of that letter to resolve it in a recorded status and if necessary, I'll bring you all in and we see each other in person. I don't like to do that because it's expensive and time consuming for you all, but it's available.

So that is my proposed next step. I'll pump that out -well, we need a date by which you'll answer the complaint
defendants and then I will issue a scheduling order.

Do you all need more time than 14 days that would otherwise be allotted, defendants?

MS. SHERIDAN: If we could have -- next week is actually spring break. If we could have an extra week that would be great.

THE COURT: So it would be 21 days. Plaintiff, any issue with that?

MR. NORTH: No objection, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay, so the answer will be due 21 days from today. Once we get that we'll pump out a scheduling order. There will be a date by which you'll file with me the joint status report. The dates that are merely suggestions, I'll say that in terms of the schedule, I expect that you all will work together to come up with milestone dates that work collectively for the case. If you put those in the joint

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status report to me and they're reasonable, I'm not going to
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       stand in the way of peace. I will make that the operative
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       scheduling order and then we'll make sure that we're all on
       the same page with regards to discovery. Sounds good?
 4
 5
                 MS. SHERIDAN:
                                 Thank you.
 6
                 MR. NORTH: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
 7
                 THE COURT: All right, thank you all. I really
 8
       appreciate your time. Take care.
 9
                  (Proceeding concluded at 2:24 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER I, Nadine M. Bachmann, Certified Realtime Reporter and Registered Merit Reporter, in and for the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, do hereby certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 753, that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the stenographically-reported proceedings held in the above-entitled matter and that the transcript page format is in conformance with the regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States. Dated this 24th day of April, 2023. -s-NADINE M. BACHMANN, CRR, RMR FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 2.4

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